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Abstract
One of the topics of paramount importance in the development of Cluster and
Grid middleware is the impact of faults since their occurrence probability in a Grid
infrastructure and in large-scale distributed system is actually very high. MPI (Message
Passing Interface) is a popular abstraction for programming distributed computation
applications. FAIL is an abstract language for fault occurrence description capable
of expressing complex and realistic fault scenarios. In this paper, we investigate the
possibility of using FAIL to inject faults in a fault-tolerant MPI implementation. Our
middleware, FAIL-MPI, is used to carry quantitative and qualitative faults and stress
testing.
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1 Introduction
A long trend in the high performance distributed systems is the increase of the number
of nodes. As a consequence, the probability of failures in supercomputers and distributed
systems also increases. So fault tolerance becomes a key property of parallel applications.
Designing and implementing fault tolerant software is a complex task. Fault tolerance is a
strong property which implies a theoretical proof of the underlying protocols. The protocol
implementation should then be checked with respect to the specification.
In order to validate this implementation, a rigorous testing approach can be used. Au-
tomatic failure injection is a general technique suitable for evaluating the effectiveness and
robustness of the distributed applications against various and complex failure scenarios.
After having validated the fault tolerant implementation, it is necessary to evaluate its
performance, in order to adapt the best protocol suitable for an actual distributed system.
Fault-Tolerant distributed applications are classically evaluated without failures. However,
performances under a failure-prone environment is also a significant information to evaluate
and tune a fault-tolerant distributed system. Automatic failure injection is desirable to
evaluate fairly different heuristics or parameters under the same failure conditions.
In this paper, we present FAIL-MPI, a software that can be used both for software
fault-injection and for stress testing of distributed applications, which are the basis for
dependability benchmarking in distributed computing. As a case study for complex fault
tolerant system, we strain the MPICH-Vcl non-blocking implementation of the Chandy-
Lamport protocol. MPICH-Vcl is a high performance fault tolerant MPI library which
provides a generic framework to add transparently the fault tolerance property to any MPI
application.
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2 FAIL-FCI: a fault injection tool
2.1 Previous works
The issues for testing component-based distributed systems have already been described
and methodology for testing components and systems has already been proposed. [THS06]
presents a thorough survey of the available tools. However, testing for fault tolerance remains
a challenging issue. Indeed, in production systems, the fault-recovery code is rarely executed
in the test-bed as faults rarely get triggered. As the ability of a system to perform well in
the presence of faults depends on the correctness of the fault-recovery code, it is mandatory
to actually stress this code. Testing based on fault-injection can be used to test for fault-
tolerance by injecting faults into a system under test and observing its behavior. The most
obvious point is that simple tests (e.g. every few minutes or so, a randomly chosen machine
crashes) should be simple to write and deploy. On the other hand, it should be possible to
inject faults for very specific cases (e.g. in a particular global state of the application), even
if it requires a better understanding of the tested application. Also, decoupling the fault
injection platform from the tested application is a desirable property, as different groups can
concentrate on different aspects of fault-tolerance. Decoupling requires that no source code
modification of the tested application should be necessary to inject faults. This also increase
the reliability of the test, since the code tested is the actual implementation that will be
run in a production environment. Finally, to properly evaluate a distributed application in
the context of faults, the impact of the fault injection platform should be kept low, even
if the number of machines is high. Of course, the impact is doomed to increase with the
complexity of the fault scenario, e.g. when every action of every processor is likely to trigger
a fault action, injecting those faults will induce an over-head that is certainly not negligible.
The table below captures the major differences between the main solutions for distributed
fault injection relatively to those criteria.
3
Criteria NFTAPE [Sa00] LOKI [CLCS00] FAIL-FCI
High Expressiveness yes no yes
High-level Language no no yes
Low Intrusion yes yes yes
Probabilistic Scenario yes no yes
No Code Modification no no yes
Scalability no yes yes
Global-state Injection yes yes yes
2.2 FAIL-FCI
We now describe briefly the FAIL-FCI framework that is fully presented in [HT05]. First,
FAIL (for Fault Injection Language) is a language that permits to easily describe fault
scenarios. Second, FCI (for FAIL Cluster Implementation) is a distributed fault injection
platform whose inputs language for describing fault scenarios is FAIL. A scenario describes,
using a high-level abstract language, state machines which model fault occurrences. The
FAIL language also describes the association between these state machines and a computer
(or a group of computers) in the network.
The FCI platform is composed of several building blocks:
The FCI compiler : The fault scenarios written in FAIL are pre-compiled by the FCI com-
piler which generates C++ source files and default configuration files.
The FCI library : The files generated by the FCI compiler are bundled with the FCI library
into several archives, and then distributed across the network to the target machines
according to the user-defined configuration files. Both the FCI compiler generated files
and the FCI library files are provided as source code archives, to enable support for
heterogeneous clusters.
The FCI daemon: The source files that have been distributed to the target machines are
then extracted and compiled to generate specific executable files for every computer
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in the system. Those executables are referred to as the FCI daemons. When the
experiment begins, the distributed application to be tested is executed through the
FCI daemon installed on every computer, to allow its instrumentation and its handling
according to the fault scenario.
3 MPICH-V: Fault Tolerant MPI
MPI (Message Passing Interface) is a standard for programming parallel applications using
message passing systems. Thanks to its high availability on parallel machines from low cost
clusters to clusters of vector multiprocessors, it allows the same code to run on different kind
of architectures. It also allows the same code to run on different generations of machines,
ensuring a long life time for the code. Moreover, MPI conforms to popular high performance,
message passing, programming styles. Even if many applications follow the SPMD program-
ming paradigm, MPI is often used for Master-Worker execution, where MPI nodes play
different roles. These three parameters make MPI a first choice programming environment
for high performance applications. MPI in its specification [SOHL+96] and most deployed
implementations (e.g. MPICH [GLDS96]) follows the fail stop semantic (specification and
implementations do not provide mechanisms for fault detection and recovery). Thus, MPI
applications running on a large cluster may be stopped at any time during their execution
due to an unpredictable failure.
The need for fault tolerant MPI implementations has recently reactivated the research
in this domain. Several research projects are investigating fault tolerance at different levels:
network [SSB+03], system [BCH+03], applications [FD00]. Different strategies have been
proposed to implement fault tolerance in MPI: a) user/programmer detection and manage-
ment, b) pseudo automatic, guided by the programmer and c) fully automatic/transparent.
For the last category, several protocols have been discussed in the literature. As a conse-
quence, for the user and system administrator, there is a choice not only among a variety of
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fault tolerance approaches but also among various fault tolerance protocols.
The best choice of fault tolerance protocol depends highly on the number of components,
the communication scheme for the parallel application, and the system behavior with respect
to failures. In this work, we strain the Chandy-Lamport implementation of the MPICH-V
project [HLBC] with high failure rates, in order to define its fault tolerance capabilities.
The Chandy-Lamport algorithm [CL85] proposes to implement fault-tolerance through
a coherent snapshot / rollback recovery protocol. During the execution, components can
trigger checkpoint waves, which build a coherent view of the distributed application. Each
process saves its image on a reliable media when entering the coherent view. When a process
is subject to failure, the distributed application is interrupted, computing resources are
allocated to replace the failed processes, and all processes rollback, that is load their last
checkpoint image that is member of a complete coherent view. Since the view builds a
possible distributed configuration of the application, the execution of the application can
pursue from this point on, according to the original specification, as if failures did not hit
the system.
The MPICH-V [HLBC] project aims at comparing the performances of different fault
tolerance protocols in the MPI implementation mpich-1 [GLDS96]. One of the protocol im-
plemented is the non-blocking Chandy-Lamport algorithm with optimizations. There are
two possible implementations of the Chandy-Lamport algorithm: blocking or non-blocking.
The blocking implementation uses markers to flush the communication channels and freezes
the communications during a checkpoint wave. On the contrary, the non-blocking implemen-
tation let the application continue during a checkpoint wave and store the messages emitted
before a wave marker in the checkpoint image. We describe more thoroughly the protocol
and its implementation below, but the capacity of storing a message in transit lead us to
implement a MPI process with two separate components, running each in a unix process: a
computation process (MPI) and a communication process (daemon). The communication
process is used to store in-transit messages and to replay these messages when a restart is
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performed.
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Figure 1: A PMI application execution on MPICH-Vcl with one fault
The protocol works as shown in the figure 1. The MPI process 1 initially receives the
marker from the checkpoint scheduler (1), stores its local state (2) and sends marker to every
process (2). From this point, every message, like m in the figure, received after the local
checkpoint and before having received the marker of the sender, is stored by the daemon
process. When the MPI process 0 receives the marker, it starts its local checkpoint and sends
a marker to every other process (3). The reception of this marker by process 1 concludes its
local checkpoint. If a failure occurs, all processes restart from their last stored checkpoint
(4) and the daemon process replays the delivery of the stored messages (5). Note that the
message m′ may be not sent again in the new execution.
MPICH implements a full MPI library from a channel. Such a channel implements the
basic communication routines for a specific hardware or for a new communication protocols.
We developed a generic framework, called MPICH-V, to compare different fault tolerance
protocols for MPI applications. This framework implements a channel for the MPICH 1.2.7
library, based on the ch p4 default channel.
MPICH-V is composed of a set of runtime components and a channel called ch v. This
channel relies on a separation between the MPI application and the actual communication
system. Communication daemons (Vdaemon) provide all communication routines between
the different components involved in MPICH-V. The fault tolerance is performed by imple-
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Figure 2: MPICH-V architecture and typical deployment
menting hooks in relevant communication routines. This set of hooks is called a V-protocol.
The V-protocol of interest for this paper Vcl, which is a non-blocking impletation of the
Chandy-Lamport algorithm.
Daemon A daemon manages communications between nodes, namely sending, receiving,
reordering and establishing connections. It opens one TCP socket per MPI process and
one per server type (the dispatcher and a checkpoint server for the Vcl implementation).
It is implemented as a mono-threaded process that multiplexes communications through
select calls. To limit the number of system calls, all communications are packed using iovec
techniques. The communication with the local MPI process is done using blocking send and
receive on a Unix socket.
Dispatcher The dispatcher is responsible for starting the MPI application. It starts the
different processes and servers first, then MPI processes, using ssh to launch remote processes.
The dispatcher is also responsible for detecting failures and restarting nodes. A failure is
assumed after any unexpected socket closure.
Failure detection relies on the Operating System TCP keep-alive parameters. Typical
Linux configurations define a failure detection as a miss of 9 consecutive losses of keep-alive
probes, where keep-alive probes are expected every 75 seconds. These parameters can be
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changed to provide more reactivity to hard system crashes. In this work, we emulated failures
by killing the task, not the operating system, so failure detection was immediate, and the
TCP connection was broken as soon as the task was killed by the operating system.
Checkpoint server and checkpoint mechanism The two implementations use the same
abstract checkpointing mechanism. This mechanism provides a unified API to address three
system-level task checkpointing libraries, namely Condor Standalone Checkpointing Library
[LTBL97], libckpt [Zan05] and the Berkeley Linux Checkpoint/Restart [JD03, SSB+03]. All
these libraries allow its user to take a unix process image in order to store it on a disk
and to restart this process on the same architecture. By default, BLCR, which is the most
up-to-date library, is used.
The checkpoint servers are responsible for collecting local checkpoints of all MPI pro-
cesses. When a MPI process starts a checkpoint, it duplicates its state by calling the fork
system call. The forked process calls the checkpoint library to create the checkpoint file
while the initial MPI process can continue the computation. The daemon associated with
the MPI process connects to the checkpoint server that first creates a new process responsible
for managing the checkpoint of this MPI process. Then 3 new connections are established
(data, messages and control) between the daemon and the server. The clone of the MPI
process writes its local checkpoint in a file, and the daemon pipelines the reading and the
sending of this file to the checkpoint server using the data connection. When the checkpoint
file has been completely sent, the clone of the MPI process terminates and the daemon closes
the data connection: then it sends the total file size using the control connection. Every
message to be logged according to the Chandy and Lamport algorithm is temporary stored
in the volatile memory of the daemon in order to be sent to the checkpoint server in the
same way using the message connection. Using this technique, the whole computation is
never interrupted during a checkpoint phase.
When a global checkpoint is complete it is not necessary to still store the past global
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checkpoints. Thus, checkpoint servers only store one complete global checkpoint at a time
using two files alternatively to store the current global checkpoint and the last complete one.
If a failure occurs, all MPI processes restart from the local checkpoint stored on the disk
if it exists: otherwise they obtain it from the checkpoint server.
Checkpoint Scheduler The checkpoint scheduler manages the different checkpoint waves.
It regularly sends markers to every MPI process. The checkpoint frequency is a parameter
defined by the user. It then waits for an acknowledgment of the end of the checkpoint from
every MPI process before asserting the end of the global checkpoint to the checkpoint servers.
The checkpoint scheduler starts a new checkpoint wave only after the end of the previous
one.
4 FAIL-MPI: merging self-deploying tools
The previously available FAIL-FCI fault-injection platform [HT05] made several assump-
tions about the distributed application that are not valid in the self-deploying MPICH-V.
Specifically, it was assumed that a ssh-like mechanism was systematically used to launch a
process in the distributed application. Then, the FAIL-FCI middleware was able to control
the launch, suspend, resume, and stop actions by using GDB with a command line interface.
As MPICH-V is also a middleware that self-deploys itself on many nodes, it was not possible
to deploy MPICH-V inside FAIL-FCI.
To circumvent this problem, we developed a new integration scheme for fault injection
that can be used for any self-deploying distributed application: FAIL-MPI. The major dif-
ference between FAIL-FCI and FAIL-MPI is that the former does not require any change
on the application under test, while the latter provides an interface for self-deploying ap-
plication, that they can use to support fault injection. Not using this interface means that
the self-deploying application will suffer no fault, while using the interface triggers the use
of the fault scenario that was designed, as in the FAIL-FCI middleware. The basic scheme
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Figure 3: FAIL-MPI integration scheme
is as follows: instead of simply launching a new process by running a command line argu-
ment, the self-deploying application registers itself with a FAIL-MPI daemon. Of course,
the FAIL-MPI daemon is expected to already run on the machine. Also, it is possible to
automate this scheme so that the change in the source code is almost transparent, e.g. by
having the command line argument replaced by a script that effectively makes the call to the
FAIL-MPI daemon. Then, the FAIL-MPI daemon manages the application specified by the
command line through a debugger to inject fault actions. Figure 3 captures this behavior.
Another new feature of FAIL-MPI is the ability to attach to a process that is already
running, so that processes that were not created from a command line argument (such as
those obtained by fork system calls) can also be used in the FAIL-MPI framework. This
requires simply to register with the FAIL-MPI daemon using the process identifier as an
argument, so that it can attach to the running process.
By these two extensions, it is possible that the application under test is not launched
by the FAIL-MPI middleware (e.g. this happens in peer to peer systems or desktop grids,
where new users are expected to join the system on a regular basis), yet a fault scenario
would typically need to perform action when new processes join or leave the system. One
obvious reason for this is that we should inject faults only on processes that are actually
running, but also that one can be interested in what happens when a process crash and a
process join occur simultaneously. As a result of the above observation, we integrated three
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new FAIL triggers (i.e. model for system events) in the FAIL language:
1. onload: this trigger occurs when a process joins the distributed application under test,
2. onexit: this trigger occurs when a process exits normally the distributed application
under test,
3. onerror: this trigger occurs when a process exists abnormally the distributed appli-
cation under test.
5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we strain the MPICH-Vcl implementation with many patterns of failures
and analyze the observed performance. For all measurement, We used the NAS parallel BT
(Block Tridiagonal) benchmark [BHS+95] class B with varying number of nodes. This bench-
mark provides complex communication schemes and is suitable for testing fault tolerance.
The class B ensures a medium sized memory footprint and is suitable for measurements in
a reasonable time.
We ran the measurements on Grid Explorer, a component of the Grid5000 platform.
Grid5000 is an experimental platform dedicated to computer science for the study of grid
algorithms, and partly founded by the French incentive action “ACI Grid”. Grid5000 as
of today consists in 13 clusters located in 9 french towns with 40 to 450 processors each,
gathering 1928 processors in total. Grid Explorer is a major component of the Grid5000
platform. It is located at Orsay and consists in 216 IBM eServer 325 computers. All com-
puters are dual-processor AMD Opterons running at 2.0 GHz with 2 GB of RAM, 80 GB
IDE hard drive and a GigaEthernet network interface card. A major feature of the Grid5000
project is the ability for the user to deploy its own environment (including operating system
kernel and distribution) over all nodes that are dedicated to the experiment. We deployed
a Linux operating system, version 2.6.13-5, including the BLCR module version 0.4.2 for
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Daemon ADV2 {
node node 1:
1 onload -> continue, goto 2;
2 ?crash -> !no(P1), goto 1;
node 2:
3 onexit -> goto 1;
4 onerror-> goto 1;
5 onload -> continue, goto 2;
6 ?crash -> !ok(P1), halt, goto 1;
}
Figure 4: FAIL-MPI scenario for every MPI computing nodes
checkpointing. We compiled the benchmarks with g77 from the FSF version 4.1.0 and the
usual optimization options (-O3).
To implement the various failure scenarios, we used a centralized approach. We designed
a specific FAIL-MPI daemon using the FAIL language to coordinate failure injection while
the other FAIL-MPI daemons control the execution of MPI computing nodes. The specific
FAIL-MPI daemon is denoted as “P1” in the remaining of the paper. For all measurements,
P1 chooses a process subject to failure according to the failure scenario, and sends a failure
order to the controlling FAIL-MPI daemon. When a daemon receives a failure order, either
a MPI node is actually running on it, or not. If there is such a MPI node, the failure is
injected and P1 receives an acknowledgement; if there is no MPI node, P1 receives a negative
acknowledgement and may choose another node to inject the failure.
Formally, the FAIL scenario used for controlling every MPI computation node is given in
Figure 4. Each FAIL-MPI daemon has two states; in state 1, it awaits for the onload event
to go to state 2. If a crash order is received (line 2), it sends the negative acknowledgement
and remains in state 1. In state 2, if the MPI node exits or is subject to an error, it goes
back in state 1 to wait for a new MPI node to register. When receiving a crash order (line
6), it sends the acknowledgement, halt the process and goes back to state 1.
Some of the experiments introduce too much stress into the application and the fault
tolerant library is not able to tolerate that level of stress. Then, the application either
freezes or enters a cycle of rollback / crash. If the application cycles between rollback and
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crashes, this denotes a level of failure too high for having any progression of the computation.
If the application freezes, this denotes a bug in the implementation (as would an execution
terminating before the finalization). For detecting both cases, we introduced a timeout on
all our experiments. After 1500 seconds, every component of the application (including
checkpoint servers, scheduler and dispatcher) is killed and the experiment is marked as non
terminating.
In every experiment, we distinguish between experiments that do not progress anymore
due to the high failure frequency (when the failure frequency is too high, the application has
no time to reach the next checkpoint wave before being hurt by a new failure, so it cannot
progress and appears to stall) and experiments that do not progress due to a bug in the
fault tolerant implementation. The difference between the two kinds of experiments is done
by analysing the execution trace. In the subsequent figures, we present the non progressing
execution percentages with a green bar and the buggy execution percentages with a red bar.
5.1 Impact of faults frequency
Figure 5 presents the impact of fault frequency on the performances of the BT class B
benchmark for 49 processes. 53 machines were devoted to this run, ensuring that enough
spare processors were found, whatever the number of failures.
The scenario, presented in Figure 5(a), injects failures at a given rate. The algorithm
for the daemon P1 is the following: A process is first randomly (and uniformly) chosen
(line 1), then a timeout is programmed (line 2). Upon expiration of the timeout (line 3), the
failure injection order is sent to the chosen process. If an acknowledgement is received, a new
process is randomly chosen and the cycle continues (line 5). If a negative acknowledgement is
received (denoting that no MPI process is running on the same node as the chosen process,
which can happen because of previous failure injections), another process is immediately
chosen (line 4) and a failure injection order is immediately sent to the new process (line 6),
until an acknowledge is eventually received.
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Daemon ADV1 {
node 1:
1 always int ran = FAIL RANDOM(0,N);
2 time g timer = X;
3 timer -> !crash(G1[ran]), goto 2;
node 2:
4 always int ran = FAIL RANDOM(0,N);
5 ?ok -> goto 1;
6 ?no -> !crash(G1[ran]), goto 2;
}
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Figure 5: Impact of faults frequency
The performance measurements are presented in Figure 5(b). The blue line represents the
total execution time of the benchmark as function of the frequency of faults; the percentage of
non-terminating experiments according to the same parameter is represented using green bars
and the percentage of bugging experiments is presented using red bars. Every experiment
was run 6 times and the value presented here is the average value of the measures.
As the scenario describes it, no overlapping faults were intended in this experiment,
and we can see that there are no buggy executions. At some point, the time between two
faults is less than the time between two checkpoints, and when this happens, the application
has not enough time to progress. Non-terminating executions appears, and progress with
the frequency of failures, up to a point where almost no execution terminates. Similarly,
the rollback/recovery algorithm takes an increasing part of the total execution when the
number of faults per minute increases, and we can see with the green line that the execution
time progresses with the number of faults per minute. This is partly contradicted by the
measurement for one failure every 45s. Tighter analysis of the experiment traces demonstrate
that for this frequency of failures, failures occur just after checkpoint waves (this is due to
the checkpoint wave frequency set at one checkpoint wave every 30s). When failures occur
just after a checkpoint wave, the rollback/recovery mechanism is the most efficient.
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Figure 6: Impact of scale
5.2 Impact of scale
Figure 6 presents the impact of the scale on the performance of the BT class B benchmark
for a given frequency of fault injection. In this experiment, one fault was injected every 50
seconds and the number of nodes running the application varies from 25 to 64 (BT needs
a natural square number of nodes). The FAIL scenario is the same as the one used in the
previous experiment (see Figure 5(a)). Each experiment was run 5 times and the average
value is presented here.
At 25 nodes, one of the five experiments was non-terminating. Every experiment are
run with the same number of checkpoint servers. Since BT use an approximately constant
memory fingerprint divided equally between the computing nodes, at 25 nodes, the size
of each checkpoint image is greater than at 36 or more nodes. So each checkpoint image
transfer individually takes more time at 25 nodes than at the other sizes. This implies that
the checkpoint and recovery times are longer for 25 nodes than the other sizes, and for one
of the experiments, the checkpoint waves were synchronized (per chance) with the failure
injection (every 50s). So there was no progression anymore. When the checkpoint image size
decreases and the checkpoint and recovery times also decrease, this phenomenon appears
with lower probability.
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The total execution time measured for the experiments with a failure injected every 50s
at different sizes is apparently chaotic. It can be very close to the time measured without
failure (at 64 nodes) or up to 2.5 times slower. In fact, a precise analysis of the measurements
demonstrates that the variance for these measurement increases with the number of nodes,
and the average value presented here is not meaningful. Failure injection at regular period
of times disregard the protocol, and failures injected just before a checkpoint wave have a
major impact on the overall performances, while failures injected just after a checkpoint
wave have an impact almost non-measurable on the performances.
In order to provide a significant measure according to this parameter, the number of
experiments to run would be extremely high. Another solution is to precisely measure the
date of failure injection as compared to the date of the last checkpoint wave, and measure
the impact of this delay on the total execution time. However, this also implies to be able
to read the variables of the program strained, which is a planned feature of FAIL-MPI, but
is not yet implemented.
5.3 Impact of simultaneous faults
Figure 7 presents the impact on the performance of the BT class B benchmark for 49 processes
of the number of simultaneous faults appearing every 50 seconds. This measurement is a
stress test for the fault tolerant MPI implementation with rare cases of simultaneous faults.
The fault injection scenario is formally given in Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b) presents the
percentage of buggy experiments and the average total execution time for 6 experiments.
The scenario is a simple variation of the previous one. At timeout expiration, not one,
but X (X being the abscissa of the figure) processes are chosen, one after the other, to
crash. Every time the master enters the node 1, it uniformly selects a process (line 2), then
at timer expiration (line 4) it sends the crash order to the selected process and enters the
node 2. Every time the process enters node 2, it select another process (line 5). In node 2, if
it receives the positive acknowledgement and there are still faults to inject (line 6), it sends
17
Daemon ADV1 {
1 int nb crash = X;
node 1:
2 always int ran = FAIL RANDOM(0,52);
3 time g timer = 50;
4 timer -> !crash(G1[ran]), goto 2;
node 2:
5 always int ran = FAIL RANDOM(0,52);
6 ?ok && nb crash > 1 ->
!crash(G1[ran]),
nb crash = nb crash - 1,
goto 2;
7 ?ok && nb crash <= 1 ->
nb crash = X,
goto 1;
8 ?no -> !crash(G1[ran]), goto 2;
}
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Figure 7: Impact of simultaneous faults
the crash order to the selected process, decrements the number of faults to inject and enters
the node 2 again. If a negative acknowledgement is received (line 8), another process is
selected by re-entering the node 2. When all failures have been injected successfully (line 7),
the number of failures to inject next time is reset to X and P1 enters the node 1, thus
programming a new timeout.
One can see that at 5 or 6 simultaneous fault injections every 50s, one third of the ex-
periments had a buggy behavior. A complete analysis of the execution trace demonstrated
that all of them where frozen during the recovery phase after a fault injection. This phe-
nomenon does not appear spontaneously with less simultaneous faults, and a majority of
the executions were not subject to this behavior, even with multiple checkpoint phases and
recovery phases (a checkpoint wave every 30s, so an average number of checkpoint waves
between 6 and 7, and a failure injection every 50s, so approximately 4 faults and recovery
per executions).
Bug hunting using FAIL-MPI In order to locate precisely the bug in MPICH-Vcl with
FAIL-MPI, we conducted a set of experiments targeting more precisely this behavior. Since
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Daemon ADV1 {
node 1:
1 always int ran = FAIL RANDOM(0,52);
2 time g timer = 50;
3 timer -> !crash(G1[ran]), goto 2;
node 2:
4 always int ran = FAIL RANDOM(0,52);
5 ?ok -> goto 3;
6 ?no -> !crash(G1[ran]), goto 2;
node 3:
7 ?waveok -> !crash(FAIL SENDER), goto 4;
node 4:
}
Daemon ADVnodes {
1 int wave = 1;
node 1:
2 onload && wave <> 2 ->
continue, wave = wave + 1,
goto 2;
3 onload && wave == 2 ->
continue, wave = wave + 1,
!waveok(P1), goto 2;
4 ?crash -> !no(P1), goto 1;
node 2:
5 onexit -> goto 1;
6 onerror -> goto 1;
7 onload && wave <> 2 ->
continue, wave = wave + 1, goto 2;
8 onload && wave == 2 ->
continue, wave = wave + 1,
!waveok(P1), goto 2;
9 ?crash -> !ok(P1), halt, goto 1;
}
(a) Scenario for P1 (b) Scenario for the nodes
Figure 8: FAIL scenario for the impact of synchronized faults
the execution trace suggested that the bug occurs at recovery time, we first designed a
scenario to inject failures during this time. The scenario we used is formally given in figure 8.
There are two scenarios, one for Process P1 (figure 8(a)), the other for the computing
nodes (figure 8(b)). The complexity of the scenario imposes to modify the generic scenario
used for the computing nodes. Roughly speaking, The algorithm for the daemon P1 is nearly
the same than the one used for the fault frequency experiments. Lines 1 to 6 are used to
ensure that the first fault is really injected (since we devoted more machines than needed
to the experiment, in order to have spare nodes, a participating node may not be executing
any MPI daemon and the positive acknowledge must be checked to ensure that a failure is
indeed injected). Then, the P1 daemon waits for a message from a computing node FAIL-
MPI daemon which denotes the beginning of a recovery wave, and send him a crash order
(line 7). After sending this order it goes in an empty state (node 4) and do not inject any
other faults during the execution.
In order to detect a recovery wave, the nodes are subject to the control of the MPI daemon
of Figure 8(b). Initially, the wave counter is set to 1, and the onload event is used to count
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Figure 9: Impact of synchronized faults
the number of recovery waves. Since the MPICH-Vcl runtime will halt every communication
daemon when a failure occurs and then relaunch a daemon on each node, this event denotes
first the initial launch, then recovery waves. So, at first, a communication daemon is subject
to the node 1 behavior, which counts the number of communication daemon launches. When
this number is 2, the daemon is in the first recovery wave, so a waveok message is sent to
the P1 process and the FAIL daemon enters node 2. On node 2, the behavior is the same as
in the previous experiments, and when the FAIL daemon receives the crash orders, it halts
the controlled process.
The performance measurements are presented in Figure 7(b). We can note that even
if we injected only 2 faults using this scenario, for every scale, some experiments did not
terminate due to a bug in the fault tolerant implementation. This demonstrate that the
bug is located in this part of the execution and is not a consequence of the size of the
application. However, a large majority of the executions is not subject to the bug, so we
have to define more precisely the conditions for failure injection. At this step, we suspected
that the recovery bug happens only if a process is subject to failure while it is in a recovery
wave, some of the other processes have not finished terminating their execution because of
the failure detection, and the MPICH-Vcl dispatcher detects the failure of the process in the
new wave. It seems that if this happens, it becomes confused between which processes are
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Daemon ADV1 {
node 1:
1 always int ran = FAIL RANDOM(0,52);
2 time g timer = 50;
3 timer -> !crash(G1[ran]), goto 2;
node 2:
4 always int ran = FAIL RANDOM(0,52);
5 ?ok -> goto 3;
6 ?no -> !crash(G1[ran]), goto 2;
node 3:
7 ?waveok -> !crash(FAIL SENDER), goto 4;
node 4:
8 ?waveok -> !nocrash(FAIL SENDER), goto 4;
}
Daemon ADV1 {
node 1:
1 onload -> continue, goto 2;
2 ?crash -> !no(P1), goto 1;
node 11:
3 onload -> !waveok(P1), stop, goto 3;
4 ?crash -> !no(P1), goto 11;
node 2:
5 ?crash -> !ok(P1), halt, goto 11;
6 onload -> !waveok(P1), stop, goto 3;
node 3:
7 ?crash -> !ok(P1), continue, goto 4;
8 ?nocrash -> continue, goto 5;
node 4:
9 before(localMPI setCommand) -> halt, goto 5;
node 5:
10 onload -> continue, goto 5;
}
(a) Scenario of P1 (b) Scenario of G1
Figure 10: FAIL scenario for the impact of synchronized faults based on MPI state
in which state and which should be restarted.
In order to demonstrate this, we conceived the last scenario presented in Figure 10. In this
experiment, we wanted to run the same scenario than the one used in the previous experiment
but using the state of the MPI daemon to determinate the position when the second fault
is injected. Because we need to ensure that the MPICH-Vcl dispatcher is confused with the
state of the process in the recovery wave, we need to inject the failure after the connection is
established and some of the initial communications are done. So, the second fault is injected
just before the MPI communication daemon calls the function localMPI_setCommand. This
function is called by the communication daemon after it exchanged the initial arguments
with the dispatcher, and this ensures that the dispatcher sees this daemon as running, so
will trigger the failure detection mechanism when the failure occurs.
The specific FAIL-MPI daemon (P1) used to coordinate the failure injection is described
in Figure 10(a). The only modification with the previous scenario is that while in the node
4, process P1 sends nocrash orders, so that the computing processes will not be blocked
when entering the localMPI_setCommand function. The FAIL-MPI daemons behaviors (G1)
controlling the execution of each MPI computing node are described in Figure 10(b). The
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Figure 11: Impact of synchronized faults depending on MPI state
algorithm for Daemon P1 is nearly the same than the on used in the previous experiments.
Only the “node 4” has been modified, because after sending a crash order to the first daemon
which detected an execution of a MPI daemon from the recovery wave, the daemon P1 must
still wait for the message from every other daemon of the second wave to send them the order
to continue their execution (line 8). Then, only the process receiving the crash order enters
the node 4 where it will inject the failure just before entering Function localMPI_setCommand
(line 9).
The corresponding measurements are presented in Figure 11. In every case, every exper-
iment froze during the recovery wave. So, we conclude that the bug in the recovery process
illustrated by the simultaneous failure injection appears when the dispatcher detects a failure
of a process already recovered, while there are still other processes in the previous execution
wave that did not received the termination order.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we use the FAIL-MPI automatic fault injection tool to strain the MPICH-Vcl
non-blocking implementation of the Chandy-Lamport protocol. We present the tool derived
from the previous available FAIl-FCI fault injection tool, and evaluate the fault tolerance
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properties of MPICH-Vcl through many experiments using the NAS bt benchmark in the
MPICH-Vcl framework.
FAIL-MPI is the first version of FAIL that allows the application under test to dynam-
ically launch and stop processes during the execution. For this purpose, we added specific
new events to the FAIL language (namely spawning of a process, exit or interrution). Using
this tool, we were able to reproduce automatically previous measurements that were done
manually, like the impact of fault frequency on the execution time [LBH+04]. This provides
the opportunity to evaluate many different implementations at large scales and compare
them fairly under the same failure scenarios.
The execution time measurements demonstrated a high variability depending on the time
elapsed between the last checkpoint wave and the fault injection. In order to provide lower
variance in the results, the FAIL language and FAIL-MPI tool shoul dbe able to read and
modify internal variables of the stressed application: this is a planned feature.
The last experiments of the paper demonstrate the high expressivity of FAIL-MPI to
precisely locate a rare bug in the dispatcher of MPICH-Vcl. We were able to demonstrate
that if a second failure hits a process already recovered after it registered with the dispatcher,
and other processes are still being stopped by the first failure detection, then the dispatcher
is confused about the state of each process and forgets to launch at least one computing
node. This bug is now corrected in the MPICH-Vcl framework and was discovered during
this work.
FAIL-MPI is a valuable tool for detecting and situating bugs, and to evaluate the per-
formance of a complex fault tolerant distributed system under precise failure conditions.
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